On Concepts

I. Knowledge is divided into (a) generally accepted concepts (concepts of the sun, moon, intellect, and the soul), and (b) those concepts that require verification (such as making certain that the heaven consists of spheres, one in the other; or that the world has been created in time).

It is necessary for every concept to have a prior concept. The concluding concept may be established without connecting it to a concept preceding it. This is true of being: the necessary and the possible. These concepts do not require one to previously perceive that something comprises them. These three are rather distinct, correct concepts, innate to understanding. If someone desires to verbally clarify these concepts, then this is only a stimulus to understanding; but they cannot be clarified beyond the clarity of the concepts themselves.

II. It is impossible for us to understand the verifications of concepts without previously having understood other things. For instance, if we wish to know that the world has been created in time, then we must have the prior certainty that the world is composite. However, all that is composite has also been originated in time; consequently we know also that the world has been originated in time. Without doubt, this verification ultimately ends in another which then does not require another to precede it for confirmation.

These, then, are the basic principles that are clearly present in the intellect: of two sides of an opposite, one must always be true, the other false; the whole is greater than any part of it. Logic is the science by which we get acquainted with these methods so that they assist us in our concepts of things and guide us to their verification. The two methods mentioned here aid us in distinguishing between complete and deficient concepts, between the certain and those only approximately certain; as well as the preponderant opinion and the doubtful one. By doing this we become aware of all the aspects of the complete concept as well as the certain verification of those that do not contain any doubt.

III. Thus we maintain: All that there is is divided into two categories. In the first category it is unnecessary to cogitate the nature of the things, since they are of a possible existence. If we reflect on the nature of the second category of things, we find that their being is a necessary one and we say accordingly, it is of necessary existence. It is not absurd to postdate that some things of possible existence are not present; for in order for a thing to exist, it must have a cause; however, if it becomes a necessary being, then it attains necessary existence through something other than that which it itself is. From this it follows that it is necessary for it to belong to that which naturally always has a possible existence and became a necessary being only by virtue of something else. This possibility either never ceases or it takes place at a particular time. The possibility cannot move forever as cause and effect, as it were, in a circle; instead it must end in something necessary to itself. The latter would be that which would be present at first. ^

IV. However, if we postulate that which is necessary as not present, then we state an absurdity. For its being has no cause, and furthermore, it cannot have its being by virtue of something else. It is the first cause of the being of things, and its being must of necessity be the prime being. We are compelled to imagine the same in every way free of want. Its being is thus complete. Moreover, its being must of necessity be the most perfect one, free from causes, i.e., matter, form, creation, and the final goal.

... The Main Problems of Abu Nasr Al-Farabi, Abu Nasr al-Farabi